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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
PETTY MOTOR LEASE, INC.,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
vs.

Case No. 15524

CLARENCE L. JOLLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-CROSS APPELLANT
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE
Petty Motor Lease, Inc.

("plaintiff") brought an

action against Clarence L. Jolley ("defendant"), claiming
amounts, including attorney's fees, due under three lease
agreements dated June 24, 1971.

Plaintiff also asserted

amounts due under another agreement dated June 24, 1971, for
the purchase of the three leased vehicles and for defendant's
failure to make certain restricted stock free trading as
required by the agreement.

Defendant counterclaimed, assert-

ing entitlement to the three vehicles which are the subject
of the three lease agreements.
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT
Judgment was awarded by the Third District Court
to Petty Motor Lease, Inc. in the amount of $10,608.55, and
defendant's counterclaim was dismissed, no cause of action.
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent and cross appellant Petty Motor Lease,
Inc. prays that the judgment be affirmed in all respects,
except that plaintiff should be awarded its reasonable
attorney's fees incurred in prosecuting its action against
defendant.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff does not disagree with the statement of
facts as set forth in appellant's brief, except for appellant's characterization, analysis or criticism of the evidence.

However, there are additional facts which are not

stated in appellant's brief, but are set forth below.

In

addition, this statement of facts includes a summary of the
facts upon which plaintiff relies for its claim of attorney's fees.
At trial, the three lease agreements were introduced as Exhibits 1-P(A), 1-P(B) and 1-P(C).

Paragraph 8 of

the leases provides in material part as follows:
User [defendant] agrees to pay all costs
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Owner [plaintiff]
in enforcement of its rights under this
agreement . .
The agreement regarding the purchase of the three
leased vehicles and the Telegift International stock was
introduced as Exhibit 1-P.

The agreement reflects that
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Clarence Jolley sold, assigned and transferred to Petty
Motor Lease, Inc. 100,000 shares of stock of Telegift International.

The agreement provides:
This stock is investment stock which
L. Jolley guarantees to have
made free-trading stock on or before
the expiration date of the three leases
referred to above, under the terms and
conditions of the Securities Act of 193334, as amended.
~larence

The expiration date of the three leases was
The stock certificates

~une

23, 1972.

(Exs. 2-P and 3-P) contain

a restrictive legend which reads as follows:
THESE SECURITIES MAY NOT BE SOLD, TRANSFERRED, PLEDGED OR HYPOTHECATED UNLESS
THEY HAVE FIRST BEEN REGISTERED UNDER
THE SECURITIES ACT OF 1933 OR UNLESS
COMPANY COUNSEL HAS GIVEN AN OPINION
THAT REGISTRATION UNDER SAID ACT IS
NOT REQUIRED.
Neuman C. Petty, president of Petty Motor Lease,
Inc., testified that in the fall of 1972, he called Clarence
Jolley on the telephone at least twice.

Specifically, Mr.

Petty related his conversations with the defendant:
A

Well, I told him that it was his responsibility to
get the stock freed up under the terms of our
agreement and nothing had been done and I wanted
him to do it or to pay the money.
He said he
would work on it and then nothing haopened and it
was relatively the same with both conversations.

Q

How long after the first was the second conversation?

A

Some months.
Three or four
Oh, I don't know.
I don't know exactly.
months maybe five.
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Q

Did you have any subsequent conversation with Mr.
Jolley?

A

Well, yes.
I had another conversation a couple of
years later, but maybe one year later with Mr.
Jolley much to the same effect.

Q

Would you tell the court that conversation?

A

Well, I was still wanting something done to either
collect the money or free up the stock and get it
sold and see how that would be at the time. When
I first called him the stock was trading actively.
I don't know how actively but, it was quoted and I
wanted to get it turned into money each time I
called and that was the purpose of my call.
(Tr.13.)
Because of defendant's failure to free up the

stock, Mr. Petty testified that he proceeded to make inquiry
as to whether the stock could become free trading.

Mr.

Petty testified that he contacted counsel for Telegift
International and Richard Bird with respect to the question
of freeing up the stock.

(Tr.14-15. l

These efforts were in

May or June of 1973, approximately one year after defendant
was required under the terms of the agreement to make the
stock free trading.

Richard L. Bird, an attorney in Salt

Lake City, testified that he was contacted by Neuman C.
Petty in 1973 and that between June and September, he reviewed the question of freeing up the stock.

No objection

was made to Mr. Bird's testimony.
Thomas R. Blonquist, who was corporate counsel for
Telegift International and its successors, testified regarding Mr. Jolley's relationship to the corporation (Tr.36-39
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- 5 and described the investment certificate signed by Mr.
Jolley:

Q

Mr. Blonquist, were there any other documents in
your files reflecting any restrictions on Mr.
Jolley's stock?

A

I think the documents that would indicate and
describe the restrictions from a securities standpoint would be the proxy statement indicating his
position by way of percentage stock ownership and
the investment certificate that he signed wherein
he agreed to take the stock for investment purposes and to not distribute them or resell them or
dispose of them without first complying with the
Securities Act of 1933.

Q

Or getting an opinion from counsel of the company.

A

That is correct and this investment certificate
specifically outlines the legend that he agreed
could be placed upon his shares.

Q

And that is--

A

On Page 2.

Q

Is that the legend that appears on the certificates 850 and 851.

A

In substance and effect that is the same thing.
The only thing that the agreement specifically
adds is that the parties to the transaction acknowledge that the shares being issued to Mr.
Jolley were issued pursuant to Section 4(2) (sic)
of the Securities Act of 1933 which of course
identified this as a private transaction as opposed to a no-sale rule under 133 or under Section
4(1) (sic) or other applicable exemptions that
could be claimed to make the shares free trading
as opposed to investment.
(Tr.40-41.)
Mr. Blonquist also testified regarding conversa-

tions in 1973 with Neuman C. Petty, and his opinion as to
whether the stock could be made freely tradeable without
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registration under the Securities Act of 1933.

In response

to the question of what he told Mr. Petty, Mr. Blonquist
testified:
A

I told him that in my view as company counsel
there were two basic objections to any disposition
by Mr. Jolley of the shares and that was one, that
he was a controlling person in the corporation,
and two, that he had signed an investment agreement agreeing not to sell, hypothecate, distribute, pledge or do anything that would violate that
investment letter and that for both of those
reasons I felt that Mr. Jolley, unlike an uncontrolling stockholder, could not be in a position
to institute proceedings either before the Commission or through any local court for relief.

Q

Now, was your opinion that, that is what you told
him.

A

That is what I told him.

Q

Now, what is your opinion then and is it now what
you told him at the time.

A

Yes, it is.

Q

And let me ask you this.
What would be required
to make those shares or what would be required
before in your opinion those shares could be made
freely trading shares.

A

Well, the only thing that I felt would do the job
would be to register the shares with the Commission for the reasons I have mentioned those restrictions limiting Mr. Jolley's activities as
they limit any officer, director or controlling
stockholder of any publicly held company and the
agreement specifically states that, you know, he
can register the shares so that would be the best
way of doing it.
(Tr.43-44.)

To this point, counsel for Mr. Jolley had not interposed any
objection to Mr. Blonquist's testimony.

Counsel for Mr.
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--- 7 Jolley objected to subsequent questions asked of Mr. Blonqui st.
Defendant Clarence Jolley was asked regarding any
requests of an opinion by company counsel:

Q

Did you ever request an opinion of company counsel
regarding transferability or free-trading status
of those shares?

A

I didn't.

(Tr. 59-60.)

In view of the evidence, the trial court made the
following findings of fact:
6. By the agreement, Exhibit 1,
defendant agreed to make the shares reflected by the certificates in Telegift
International, Inc. freely tradeable on
or before June 23, 1972, whereupon plaintiff would be entitled to sell the stock
and apply the proceeds of the sale to the
rental due under the terms of the lease
agreement, and the balance toward the
purchase price of the vehicles as provided
in the agreement.
The agreement provides
that plaintiff is entitled to the excess
of the proceeds of such sale, or if the
stock provided less than the amount required to pay the leases and the purchase
price, defendant would pay the balance up
to $10,000, plus sales tax and interest.
7. The stock certificates each contain the following legends in red type:
"Investment stock" and "These securities
may not be sold, transferred, pledged or
hypothecated unless they have first been
registered under the Securities Act of
1933 or unless Company counsel has given
an opinion that registration under said
Act is not required."
8.
On March 25, 1971, defendant
signed an investment certificate whereby
he agreed not to sell any stock of Telegift International, Inc. unless such
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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stock was registered under the Securities Act of 1933 or unless company counsel gave an opinion that registration
under said Act is not required.
9. Defendant did not register the
100,000 shares of stock, did not receive
an opinion from company counsel that
registration was not required, and did
not otherwise make the stock freely tradeable as required by the agreement, Exhibit 1.
(Tr.38-39.)
ARGUMENT
POINT I.

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT TO WHICH APPELLANT OBJECTS ARE CORRECT AND PROPER AND SUPPORTED
BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
This Court has reiterated many times the various

rules of appellate review.

In an action at law the Supreme

Court does not reverse on issues of fact where the trial
court's findings are supported by the evidence or the lack
thereof.

Martin v. Martin, 29 U.2d 413, 510 P.2d 1102;

Branch v. Western Factors, Inc., 28 U.2d 361, 502 P.2d 570
(1972).

In Phillips Manufacturing Co. v. Putnam, 29 U.2d

69, 504 P.2d 1376 (1973), this Court stated the rules of
appellate review as follows:
[T]his court does not reverse and direct
an essential affirmative finding unless
the evidence so compels, that is, that it
is such that all reasonable minds acting
fairly thereon must necessarily so find.
Conversely, if there is a reasonable basis
in the evidence or from the lack of evidence
from which the court acting fairly and reasonably thereon could remain unconvinced,
its refusal to so find must be sustained.
Moreover, in applying the tests just stated
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to the evidence, we are obliged to view the
evidence and reasonable inferences that can
be drawn therefrom in the light favorable to
the findings and judgment.
(Footnotes omitted.)
Where the evidence justifies the ruling of the trial court,
the appellate court does not reverse the judgment unless
there are errors involved which require reversal as a matter
of law.

Parker v. Telegift International, Inc., 29 U.2d 87,

505 P. 2d 301 (1973).
In Nance v. City of Provo, 29 U.2d 340, 509 P.2d
365 (1973), this Court stated:
Members of an appellate court do not have
the opportunity to hear the witnesses and
see their demeanor in court and on the witness stand and are not in as good a position
to weigh the testimony as is the trial
judge or jury.
It is our duty on appeal
to affirm the trial court in its findings
of fact where there is competent evidence
to support those findings.
(Footnote omitted.)
There was substantial evidence to support the
findings, conclusions and judgment of the trial court.

It

was the testimony of Neuman C. Petty that on several occasions he informed defendant that plaintiff was looking to
defendant to perform his obligations under the contract.
Defendant contradicted this testimony, but the trial court
found in favor of plaintiff, giving the greater weight to
the testimony of plaintiff's president.

It cannot be said

that this is not substantial evidence.
In his brief on appeal, appellant erroneously
refers to "weight of the evidence" and "uncorroborated
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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testimony" as elements of the test.

The test on appellate

review is a substantial evidence test; the trier of fact
considers the weight of the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses.
There is a further rule of appellate review stated
in First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 27 U.2d 1,
492 P.2d 132 (1971), which is applicable in this case before
the Court.

In the First Western case, this Court stated:
In addition to and supplementing the usual
rule of review on appeal, that we survey
the evidence in the light favorable to the
trial court's findings, this further comment is applicable here. For the appellant's
position is that the trial court erred in
refusing to make certain findings essential
to its right to recover, and insists that
the evidence compel such findings, it is
obliged to show that there is credible and
uncontradicted evidence which proves those
contended facts with such certainty that
all reasonable minds must so find.
Conversely, if there is any reasonable basis,
either in the evidence or from the lack of
evidence upon which reasonable minds might
conclude that they are not so convinced by
a preponderance of the evidence, then the
finding should not be overturned.
(Footnote
omitted.)
Defendant has not and cannot make the showing

required by the First Western case.

The best defendant can

assert is that the evidence is controverted, which is not an
adequate showing for reversal of the trial court's judgment.
See Super Tire Market, Inc. v. Rollins, 18 U.2d 122, 417
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The cases cited above refer to uncontra-

dicted testimony and evidence so strong that all reasonable
minds would so find as necessary to compel a court to make
certain findings essential to a party's right to recover;
the evidence is not uncontradicted and is not of the weight,
in defendant's favor, that the trial court should be compelled to find other than it did.
It is not inconsistent with the trial court's
findings, conclusions and judgment that plaintiff, when
defendant had failed to perform, attempted to have the
restrictions upon the stock removed and made several inquiries with respect to making the stock free trading.
Certainly defendant should not have a basis to object to
efforts on the part of plaintiff to remove the restriction
on the stock when defendant had failed to do so.

Efforts by

a damaged party to end or mitigate his damages cannot be
construed, without more, as inconsistent with the damaged
party's right to require performance of the other party as
required by the contract, and for damages for such other
party's failure to perform.

See Bjork v. April Industries,

Inc., infra.
Defendant is attempting to have this Court substitute its findings for those of the trial court, or perhaps
even more accurately, defendant attempts to have this Court
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- 12 substitute the facts as defendant would have them for the
trial court's determination of the facts.

Defendant has not

and cannot show that there was not substantial evidence to
support the findings of the trial court and his attempt to
substitute someone else's findings for the trial court's
findings must fail.
POINT II. THE COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF
LAW WERE AGAINST DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS OF ESTOPPEL
AND WAIVER, AND SUCH FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS ARE
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
Neuman C. Petty testified that he told defendant
at least twice that plaintiff was looking to defendant to
perform his obligations under the contract to make the stock
free trading.

Defendant's testimony was contradictory, but

the trial court accepted testimony favorable to plaintiff,
and that testimony constitutes substantial evidence and
supports the trial court's findings and conclusions.
For this Court to reverse the trial court's findings, defendant must show "that there is credible and uncontradicted evidence which proves those contended facts with
such certainty that all reasonable minds must so find."
First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., supra.

Defen-

dant cannot show uncontradicted evidence supporting his
claim of waiver and estoppel.
Defendant asserts that plaintiff waived defendant's
requirement to free up the stock within the period required
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by the contract and that plaintiff took upon itself the
responsibility to do so.

The trial court found otherwise

and the evidence is such that the trial court's findings,
conclusions and judgment should be affirmed.

Aopellant

cites plaintiff's attempts to free up the stock itself as
evidence of plaintiff's waiver of defendant's obligation to
free the stock.

The evidence suggests otherwise.

First,

there is no evidence in the record that Clarence L. Jolley
knew of the efforts of plaintiff to free

~P

the stock.

Without such knowledge, relied upon by defendant, there
could be no estoppel, and waiver requires the relinquishment
of a known right.

Second, plaintiff's inquiries into

freeing up the stock were made after the date defendant's
performance was due.

That is, plaintiff made inquiry re-

garding freeing up the stock only after the date had passed
when the defendant had guaranteed in the agreement that the
stock would be free trading.
These facts are similar to those in Bjork v. Anril
Industries, Inc., 547 P.2d 219

(Utah, 1976), particularly

with reference to waiver and plaintiff's responsibilities
under the contract.

This Court's opinion is quoted at

length:
The trial court found that the nlaintiffs were the owners of shares vali~ly and
legally issued to them as compensation for
services rendered, and that plaintiffs' shares
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- 14 were the subject of the "piggyback" registration agreement which entitled plaintiffs'
shares to registration when April made a public offering of its shares.
APril later ~ade
a public offering but declined to register
plaintiffs' shares.
The agreement was not
honored by April in spite of numerous inquiries
and suggestions that it be honored.
During
the period that plaintiffs were endeavoring
to have April honor the registration agreement, the stock offered in the oublic offering
rose in price substantially.
Upon these facts, the trial court held
that plaintiffs did not effectively convey
to April their desire to sell their shares
and should have taken steps to enforce the
agreement and denied recovery of damages but
ordered April to deliver shares without the
restriction theretofore placed on the shares.
We know of no rule of law that either
requires or permits this result.
Demand is
not necessary where both parties have equal
knowledge of the contract provision, or where
the defaulting party denies the obligation.
See 17 Am.Jur.2d 794, Contracts Sec. 356.
Either April performed its contract (which
it did not) or Aoril breached its contract
(which it did) by failing to register the
shares.
Plaintiffs were entitled to damaqes
flowing from that breach, subject only to
the plaintiffs' obligation to mitigate those
damages, if possible.
The only possible
manner in which damages could have been reduced would have been a sale of the shares
through the use of S.E.C. Rule 144.
The
application of this rule depended upon a
favorable opinion by April's legal counsel
which was never offered.
It is not the r~
sponsibility of a party damaged by another's
breach to plead with the breaching party to
help the damaged party mitigate damages.
The defendant's claim of waiver is adequately controlled by our decision in Phoenix
Ins. co. v. Heath, 90 Utah 187, 61 ?.2d 308.
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- 15 Waiver must be an intentional relinouishment
of a known right.
The facts here do not support a claim or finding of "intentional
relinquishment" of the rights of the plaintiffs to have their shares registered at
the time of the public offering by the defendant.
(Emphasis the Court's.)
In the present case, defendant either performed
his contract or breached the contract.

The trial court

found defendant breached the contract.

The efforts of

plaintiff to resolve the problem, to mitigate its own damages, is not a waiver of its rights under the agreement.
See April Industries, supra.

The law does not require

plaintiff to make more demands of defendant than it did in
this case; as stated in April Industries, supra: "Demand is
not necessary where both parties have equal knowledge of the
contract provision

The obligation of performance

was on defendant.
The evidence is substantial in supporting the
trial court's findings and against defendant's claim of
waiver.

Defendant has not and cannot meet the requirement

of First Western Fidelity v. Gibbons & Reed Co., supra.
POINT III.THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS WERE PROPER
AND ANY OBJECTION THERETO WAS WAIVED BY DEFENDANT.
Defendant made no objection to the testimony of
Richard Bird.

Further, defendant made no objection to the

testimony of Thomas Blonquist regarding Mr. Blonquist's
conversations with Neuman C. Petty, including the opinion
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- 16 given to Mr. Petty that Telegift International, Inc., or its
successor, would object to any attempt to free up the Jolley
stock.

Defendant's failure to object timely constitutes a

waiver of any objection he might have had.

In Child v. Child,

8 U.2d 261, 332 P.2d 981 (1958), appellant cited receipt of
hearsay testimony as error.

This Court stated:

Whatever merit there may have been to this
objection, the defendant is now precluded
from voicing it.
The testimony was elicited
without objection.
This constituted a waiver
of the right to question its competency. And
the evidence being so received could be relied
upon as proof of the fact to which it related.
(Citations omitted.)
Similarly, in State in the Interest of Christensen v.
Christensen, 227 P.2d 760 (1951), this Court stated:
As a further ground for reversal, the
appellant contends that the court erred
in admitting in evidence testimony as
to matters which were not embraced within
the allegations of the petition for rehearing of the case and for modification
of the court's order.
Assuming that the
admission of such testimony was erroneous
because it was outside the allegations of
the petition charging Lynn with violating
the order of probation, the appellant cannot complain of that error on appeal because
he had to object to the admission of such
testimony at the hearing.
See Scott v. Scott, 19 U.2d 267, 430 P.2d 580 (1967).

In

Porcupine Reservoir Co. v. Lloyd W. Keller Corp., 15 U.2d
318, 392 P.2d 620 (1964), appellant alleged error for the
trial court's refusal to separate trials for each of the
three defendants.

The record did not disclose any request
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- 17 for separate trials nor any objection to the court's decision to try the matters in one trial.

This Court held that

it would not review a ground of objection not urged in the
trial court.
Defendant, not objecting to the evidence at the
time of trial, waived any objections which he had, and those
objections cannot be raised on appeal for the first time.
Rule 4 of the Rules of Evidence is consistent with the
foregoing in that it requires (1) a timely objection "so
stated as to make clear the specific ground of objection,"
and (2) that "the admitted evidence should have been excluded on the ground stated and probably had a substantial
influence in bringing about the verdict or finding."

Defen-

dant does not meet either test since (1) there was no objection, and (2) the evidence was admissible.
The restrictive legend on the stock required
either an opinion of company counsel or registration of
stock under the Securities Act of 1933.

Graham Dodd, not

being company counsel, was not qualified to testify regarding freeing up of the stock.

Counsel for plaintiff made

timely objection to Mr. Dodd's testimony and the trial court
properly refused to receive the testimony.

Mr. Dodd's

testimony was irrelevant as to freeing up the stock since he
was not company counsel.

The best he could do for defendant
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would be to testify that the stock could be freed up; that
would still leave defendant with the obligation of actually
freeing up the stock by registration, opinion of company
counsel, or a legal action.

Mr. Dodd's testimony, and the

proffer made by defendant's counsel, was irrelevant since it
did not show, and was not intended to show, that defendant
had performed his obligation under the contract.

The issue

is not the legal question of whether the stock could have
been made unrestricted, but whether defendant met the requirement of making the stock free trading.

The testimony

was properly refused by the trial court.
Further, in light of what the proffered evidence
could show, there is no basis for reversal of the trial
court's findings and judgment.

Rule 5 of the Rules of Evi-

dence precludes setting aside a finding or reversing a
judgment because of erroneous exclusion of evidence unless
"the excluded evidence would probably have had a substantial
influence in bringing about a different verdict or finding."
Again, since the issue was not whether the stock could have
been made free trading, but whether defendant performed his
obligation to make it free trading, the proffered evidence
would not have brought about a different finding.
The trial court's findings, conclusions and judgment should be affirmed.
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- 19 POINT IV. PLAINTIFF WAS ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES.
The three lease agreements (Exs. 1-P(A), 1-P(B)
and 1-P(C)) provide in paragraph 8, in material part:
"User [defendant] agrees to pay all costs
and expenses, including reasonable attorney's fees, incurred by Owner [plaintiff]
in enforcement of its rights under this
agreement
This is the type of contractual provision between parties
which this Court has required, in absence of statute, for
the award of attorney's fees.

B & R Supply Co. v. Bringhurst,

28 U.2d 442, 503 P.2d 1216 (1972); Slim Olson, Inc. v. Winegar,
122 Utah 80, 246 P.2d 608 (1952).
The amount and reasonableness of the attorney's
fees arenot disputed.

Defendant's answer admitted the

allegations of paragraph 7 of plaintiff's complaint:
7. The lease agreements provide for
the payment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees incurred by plaintiff in the
enforcement of its rights under the lease
agreements.
Plaintiff has been forced to
hire counsel by defendant's actions, and
a reasonable fee to be awarded to plaintiff
for the use and benefit of its attorney
herein is the sum of $2,000.
When a party by his pleading concedes a fact, no
proof is thereafter required for a finding upon the matter
so confessed.
1949).

Butler v. Stratton, 212 P.2d 43 (Cal.App.

No further proof was necessary, and plaintiff, by
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- 20 virtue of the provisions of the lease agreements, was entitled to the attorney's fee of $2,000.
The merger of the leases into a sales agreement
~

does not preclude plaintiff's claim for attorney's fees.
the contrary, it requires the award of attorney's fees.

As

stated in National Surety Corp. v. Christiansen Brothers,

I~.

29 U.2d 460, 511 P.2d 731 (1973):
[W]here parties engage in negotiations
concerning a transaction, pursuant to
which they enter into a written contract,
it is presumed that all matters relating
to the subject are merged in and constitute a complete integration of their agreement.
(Footnote omitted.)
The agreement between the parties included the three lease
agreements and the agreement for sale of the leased vehicles, which specifically referred to the three leases.

The

three leases provide for attorney's fees, and the doctrine
of merger requires that the entire agreement be given effect.
This requires that plaintiff be awarded its attorney's fees
in this action.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's findings of fact related to
defendant's performance or breach of the contract are supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed.
Similarly, the trial court's findings against defendant's
claims of estoppel or waiver are supported by substantial
evidence and should be affirmed.
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- 21 The trial court's evidentiary rulings were proper,
or any objection to such rulings were waived by defendant.
Further, there is no showing that the admitted or excluded
evidence would probably have had a substantial influence in
bringing about a different verdict or finding.
Finally, the lease agreements provide for attorney's fees and the amount and reasonablene?S thereof were
admitted by defendant.

Plaintiff should be awarded its

attorney's fees in the amount of $2,000, and the trial
court's findings, conclusions and judgment revised accordingly.
DATED this

day of February, 1978.
Respectfully submitted,
MOYLE & DRAPER

Wayne G. Petty
Attorney for Plaintiff-Respondent
600 Deseret Plaza
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the

~~-

day of February,

1978, two true and correct copies of the foregoing Brief of
Plaintiff-Cross Appellant were mailed, postage prepaid, to
Lorin N. Pace and Randall Bunnell, Attorneys for Appellant,
431 South Third East, B-1, Salt Lake City, Utah.
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